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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 25 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 81-430 CSY
Cert to Ill S Ct {Ward for the
court; Moran [diss] with
Underwood)

Illinois
v.
Gates, et ux.
SUMMARY:

State/Criminal

Timely

The state contends that a letter from an

anpnymous informer, together with corroborating circumstances,
was sufficient probable cause under Aguilar for issuang€ of a
search warrant.
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW:

Police in Bloomingdale,

Illinois, received an anonymous letter regarding the resps.
{b_ dlh~'V ~ ~ ~.) ~-::I_~ ~ &-wu- v-tuz_
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listed their address and stated that they made their living
selling drugs.
operation.

Further, the letter described their method of

According to the letter, resp Sue would drive resps'

car to Florida where it would be loaded with drugs.
would fly to Florida and drive the car back.
return by plane.

Resp Lance

Then Sue would

Moreover, the letter warned that Sue would

drive to Florida on May 3 as part of another drug transaction.
And, the letter told the police that resps had over $100,000 in
drugs in their basement.
With the help of a confidential informant who provided
police with access to financial records, the police confirmed
that the letter gave resps' correct address.

Police also

discovered that L. Gates had a reservation on a May 5 flight to
Florida.

A DEA agent followed Lance, who flew to Florida and

went to a motel room registered to Sue.

The agent saw Lance

leave with a woman {presumably Sue) in a car with Illinois tags.
The police found that the tags were registered in Lance's name,
but for a different car.
The police then obtained a search warrant from an Illinois
court to search resps' home and the car they were using in
Florida.
po~ice

Resps arrived back at their home by car on May 7.

The

were waiting, searched the trunk of resps' car, and found

350 lbs of marijuana.
drug paraphernalia.

In the house were marijuana, weapons, and
In addition, resps were in

cocaine.

posses~ion

of

~

Resps were indicted for drug offenses, and Lance was charged
with possession of an unlicensed firearm.

Pretrial, resps moved

·.
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to suppress the fruits of the search, contending that the letter
did not provide probable cause for the warrant.

They argued that

the anonymous letter did not set forth the underlying
circumstances on which the informer based his report or
underlying circumstances which would indicate that the letter was
reliable, as required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 {1964).
They also contended th7

corroborate the

the police investigation did not

accu ~ ion

criminal activity.

that the resps were involved in

Tfie trial court agreed with resps, and the

Ill Ct App affirmed.
The Ill S Ct also affirmed.

Aguilar has two prongs, a

"basis of knowledge" prong and a veracity prong.

The letter

fails the first test, because it did not describe how the
informer knew that resps were involved in the drug trade.

The

informer's report may have been based on hearsay, not the
informer's personal observation.

The letter also fails the

veracity test, because the police had no idea who the informer
was.

They had no way of knowing whether the informer could be

trusted or not.

And, unlike the informer in United States v.

Harris, 403 U.S. 573 {1971), this informant made no statement
against penal interest.
Furthermore, the corroborating police investigation did not
cure these deficiencies.
41~

{1969).

See Spinelli v. United States, 393

The police determined that the informer

correct address and that resps' were driving back

g~ve

u.s.

resps'

-

from~lorida,
7-

but those details did not establish that the informer's letter
was based on personal knowledge rather than rumor.

Also, the
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police investigation discovered no criminal activity before the
search.

Thus, the police had no reason to think that this

anonymous informer wrote from personal knowledge or that he was
reliable.

The investigation was not sufficient to satisfy

Aguilar.
The dissent thought that the corroborating investigation,
combined with the detail of the letter, satisfied Augilar.

The

corroborating information demonstrated that the informer had an
adequate basis for his knowledge.

This case is like Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), in which the police confirmed
the details of an informer's story to obtain probable cause.

The

corroborating information also showed that the informer was
probably telling the truth.

The police may have discovered only

innocent activity, but the informer's letter contained many
details which proved accurate, so that the innocent activity
became suspicious in light of the letter's accusations.
CONTENTIONS:
dissent.

The state elaborates on the arguments of the

When an informer's tip is sufficiently detailed, it

will confirm itself.
concurring).

See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J.,

This case is like Draper, in which the informer's

report was corroborated and the Court found probable cause.

It

is_not like Spinelli, in which the Court found no probable cause
be~ause

the informer provided few details and the police

investigation supplied only limited corroboration.
Whitely v. Warden, 401

u.s.

560 (1971) (informant's

Sea also
tip~an

supply

probable cause together with information gathered by police).

In
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addition, under Draper, innocent activity can help to provide
probable cause, if it corroborates an informant's story.
Resps observe that all three Illinois courts determined: (1)
the anonymous letter did not describe the means by which the
informer obtained his information; (2) the corroboration of
innocent detail was insufficient to cure the inadequate "basis of
knowledge" information in the letter; (3) reliance on Draper is
misplaced, because that case involved a previously reliable
informer, one who supplied a greater degree of specificity of
detail.
Resps also insist that this is a fact-bound case applying
the established rules of Aguilar.

Furthermore, the case involves

an anonymous letter, a notoriously unreliable source of
information.
DISCUSSION:

This case boils down to a factual disputeover

whether it is more like Spinelli or Draper.

Three Illinois

courts decided that the corroboration in this case did not
demonstrate that a tip in an anonymous letter provided probable
cause.

Although the tip ultimately proved correct, there was no

reason to believe that the author of the letter would tell the
truth, and the police investigation revealed no criminal
activity.
ca~se,

letter.

The Illinois S Ct might have reasonably found probable

based on the corroboration of several details in the
But its decision is not clearly in error,

is fact-bound.
I recommend denial.

and~this

case
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There is a response.

November 5, 1981

I

'

Holleman

Opn in petn

I

February 26, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 5
No. 81-430

Motion of Petition for Leave to
Amend or Enlarge Questions Presented
for Review

ILLINOIS

v.
GATES, et ux.
SUMMARY:

~

.

Although it was not raised _ln the courts below, petr moves to
........

"----

amend or enlarge the question presented in its petn for cert to the Ill. S.Ct.,

--------------------------------------~------------~--·
granted
on January 11, 1982, to include the issue of the "good faith"
exception to the
I~~:

exclusionar~.

---

......,.--Acting on a letter from an anonymous informant concerning drug

dealings by the resps, the police confirmed some of the facts alleged in the
letter, consulted with an assistant state's attorney who wrote the complaint,
and then obtained a search warrant from an associate judge.

The trial court

agreed with resps that the anonymous letter and the police investigation
~~

failed to provide adequate probable cause under bgyl}§t v.

'

m

l

~~.

378 U.S. 108
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filed in August 1981 and on January 11, 1982, the Court granted cert on the
following question:
Whether detailed information provided to police
by an anonymous informer, coupled with government
corroboration of the information, provide probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant?
~~IQN~:

Petr states that subsequent to the hearing of this case in

the Ill. courts, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has
received serious attention by appellate courts.
v.

Unit-~~.

Citing, igt_§f_ $li~.

365 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1961) and

~~er-Tongue

QQ~t~ll9c

Labs, Inc. v.

Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 319-21 (1971), the petr argues that
this Court has considered issues not raised below where there has been a
change in the law or where a
(Motion at 3).

·~asic

unfairness might escape review . . . "

Petr also notes that in Taylor v. Alabama, No. 81-5152, cert

granted on November 3, 1981, (Dunaway issue) the State of Alabama and amicus
have raised the good faith exception in their briefs.
case, claims the

pet~

obtaining the warrant.

The record in this

establishes that the police acted in good faith in
Thus, the Question Presented should be enlarged or

amended to include the following:
Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to
obtain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), should the evidence
obtained under the warrant nevertheless be admitted
at trial because the police acted in a reasonable
good faith belief in the validity of the warrant?
DISCUSSION:

Rule 2l.l(a) of this Court's Rules states in part that:

The statement of a question presented will be
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question
fairly included therein. Only the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein
will be considered by the Court.
Embodied in this rule is the proposition that this Court will generally not
review issues not raised below or in the petition.

See generally, Stern and

- 3 -

Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 456-465 (1978).
exist, as noted by petr, supra.

Exceptions to the rule

But petr's arguments for now amending the

question to include a matter not raised below or in the cert petn are Hot
persuasive.

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not a
I

late-breaking development;l petr could have at least raised the issue in its
cert petn in August 1981 rather than waiting until the eleventh hour to move
for an amendment.2 There being no compelling arguments for granting an
exception to the general rule of limiting plenary review to issues presented
below, this motion should be denied.
There is no response.
2/24/82

Schlueter

PJC

1Tbe good faith exception was, according to the petr, given first
"significant judicial recognition" in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830,
846-847 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert den. 101 S.Ct. 946 (1981). Petr is
apparently discounting recognition of the exception by commentators and
members of this Court. See~·· Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring).
2Petr's brief on the merits is due on February 25, 1982.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS v. LANCE GATES ET

ux.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 81-430.

,.\~

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
I dissent for the reason that the Illinois Supreme Court
clearly misapplies well settled law that a detailed tip from an
anonymous informant, which is subsequently corroborated
by the police, presents sufficient probable cause to support a
search warrant. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959) ..
The Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an
anonymous letter giving respondents' address and stating
that they made their living selling drugs. The letter contained a detailed description of respondents method of operation: that respondent Susan Gates would drive her car to
Florida where it would be loaded with drugs; that respondent
Lance Gates would fly to Florida and drive the car back; that
respondent Susan Gates would then return by airplane. The
letter stated that a drug transaction would occur on May 3d.
Finally, the letter stated that respondents had over $100,000
in drugs in their basement.
The police confirmed, through a confidential informant,
that the address in the letter was correct. Respondent
Lance Gates made a reservation and flew to Florida on May
5th. He went to a motel room registered to his wife and
later left in an automobile with tags registered in his name,
although for another automobile. After observing this detailed corroboration of the anonymous letter, the Bloomingdale police ootaine<I a warrant to search respondents home
and the car that they were using in Florida. When respondents arrived back in Illinois by car on ~ay 7th, the police
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ILLINOIS v. GATES

searched the trunk of the car and found 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the house revealed marijuana, weapons,
and drug paraphernalia.
The activities of respondents corresponded almost precisely with the predictive statements contained in the letter,
making this an a fortiori case under D.:31!2[ v. United States,
358 U. S. 307 (1959). Despite this strong corroboration, the
Illinois courts suppressed the evidence obtained from the
search warrants. Applying the two-pronged test of Aguil.{;r
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the anonymous letter failed either to state the
basis of the informant's knowledge or to provide sufficient information to evaluate the truthfulness of the informant.*
The Illinois court found the substantial corroboration insufficient to cure these defects because it failed to establish that
the informant based the tip on personal knowledge. The Illinois Court-misapplying Draper-also concluded that great
detail in the anonymous tip is not, alone, sufficient to establish the veracity of the informant. Finally, the Court observed that the corroborating evidence was of "clearly inno~ty.

In Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), this
Court found probable cause when a previously-reliable informant supplied information describing the defendant's clothing and physical appearance and stating that the defendant
would be at a train at a certain time as part of a drug transaction. The police arrested and searched defendant after the
information from the informant was corroborated by the personal observation of the police. The activity involved in
Draper, like the activity in this case, was not criminal when
viewed in isolation. When Draper's activity was viewed in
*The Illinois Supreme Court cited provisions from both the federal and
state constitutions. It is readily apparent from the decision, however,
that the Illinois Supreme Court was relying on federal constitutional
State Tax Comm'n v. VanCott, 306 U. S.
grounds to justify its holding.
511, 514 (1939) (state and federal grounds so interwoven that it is impossible to conclude that the judgment rests on an independent interpretation of
state Jaw).

~
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light of the informant's information, however, it took on an
"aura of suspicion" sufficient to justify a finding of probable
cause. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 418 (1969).
In ~i, supra, an affidavit in support of a search warrant contained information that a "confidential reliable informant" had stated that a bookkeeping operation was being
maintained at a certain address. The police also observed
activities consistent with a bookkeeping operation, but which
were in themselves innocent. In holding that the informant's information was not sufficient to establish probable
cause, the Court noted that "it is especially important that
the E£ describe the accused's criminal activit in sufficient
detail that the rna ·stra e may now tlia he is relying on
something more substan ·a than a casua rumor circulating in
the un erwor doran accusatiOn ased mere yon an individual's general reputation." 393 U. S., at 416 (emphasis
added). In this case, as in Draper, the judicial officer issuing
the warrant could resonably infer from the detailed information, which was provided by the informant and subsequently
corroborated by the police, that the informant was indeed
trustworthy and had obtained his information in a "reliable
way." Spinelli, 393 U. S., at 417. Verification of reliability
of both the information and the informant was the purpose of
the two-pronged Aguilar rule. Draper and Spinelli establish that this verification may come from the police corroboration of the detailed tip of an anonymous informant.
In light of the established guidelines of Draper and
Spinelli, I would grant the petition for certiorari and summarily reverse the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court:--
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C HAM BE RS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

81-430 - Illinois v.

Gates

The suggested order for reargument in this case is
as follows:

"This case
is
restored to the
calendar for reargument.
In addition to the
question
presented
in
the
petition
for
certiorari and previously argued here, the
parties are requested to address the question
whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a
criminal
trial
of
evidence
obtained
in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 u.s. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 u.s. 383 (1914), should to any
extent be modified, so as, for example, not
to require the exclusion of evidence obtained
in the reasonable belief that the search and
seizure at issue was consistent with the
Fourth Amendment."

November 11, 1982

81-430 - Illinois v. Gates

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the
Illinois Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the
parties to address.

That decision was consistent with the

-

Court's settled practice of not permitting a party to advance a

--------- ----""""------·------

ground for reversal that was not presented below.

The reversal

today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a flagrant
departure from its settled practice, but also raises serious
questions concerning the Court's management of its certiorari
jurisdiction.

I am therefore unable to join the Court's decision

to order reargument of this case.

I

As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litigation
are minimized and the ~ecisional process is expedited if a court
is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses.

We set a poor

example for other judges when we suddenly reverse our prior
rulings in the same case.

I

- 2 -

On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for
review in this case.

The motion asked the Court to incorporate

the following question:
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to
obtain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964), should the evidence
obtained under the warrant nevertheless be admitted at
trial because the police acted in a reasonable good
faith belief in the validity of the warrant?"

On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that motion.

On

October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of argument; they
respected our decision and did not attempt to argue the question
of good faith.

Today, the Court asks the parties to reargue the

case in order to address the very question it would not allow the parties to argue last month.

This type of inconsistent

decisionmaking always imposes unnecessary costs on litigants and
is wasteful of the judiciary's most scarce resource--time.

II

As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally
undesirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportunity to
consider. 1

It is especially poor practice to do so when the

1 of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new
argument as an alternative basis for affirming the decision
below. E. g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240 n.6
Footnote continued on next page.

l'<Vo

O.J..-"t.:>U

-
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basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which neither
party adduced any evidence.

...._:----=-----...

Those considerations apply with

special force when the judgment of the highest court of a
sovereign state is being reviewed. 2

Each of these considerations applies to the additional
question on which the Court has ordered reargument.

Neither

party gave the Circuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Second District, or the Supreme Court of

{1977) •
2writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 u.s.
437, JUSTICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the
Court's traditional stance.
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal
constitutional issues raised here for the first time on
review of state court decisions both before [Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368 {1836)], Miller v. Nicholls, 4
Wheat. 311, 315 {1819), and since, e.g., Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., Inc.,
360 U.S. 334, 342, n.7 {1959); State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160-163
{1945); McGoldrick v. Compagnie General
Transatlantique, 309 u.s. 430, 434-435 {1940); Whitney
v. California, 274 u.s. 357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v.
DesMoines, 173 u.s. 193, 197-201 (1899); Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).

*

*

*

"Questions not raised below are those on which the
record is very likely to be inadequate, since it
certainly was not compiled with those questions in
mind." 394 U.S., at 438-439.
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 u.s. 308, 317
(1937); Wilson v. Cook, 327 u.s. 474, 483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 u.s. 653, 677-682 (WHITE, J., concurring). See
generally R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 456-465
(5th ed. 1978).

- 4 Illinois an opportunity to consider the question.

Neither party

offered any evidence concerning the state of mind of the
magistrate when he issued the warrant, the state of mind of the
officers who obtained the warrant, or the state of mind of the
officers who executed the

warrant~

In short, the new issue was

not "fairly presented" to the state courts.
Connor, 404

u.s.

Cf. Picard v.

270 {1971).

III

As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject to
question.

That question is serious whether one assumes that the

Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question correctly
or incorrectly.

On the one hand, if it is assumed that the · Supreme Court of
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment.
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300

u.s.

308, 317 {1937).

If the only federal question presented by a certiorari petition
is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legitimate basis
for reversal, this Court has no power to grant certiorari simply
because it would like to address some other federal question.

3 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on
the basis of an affidavit such as that filed by the police
officer in this case.

- 5 -

For neither Article III of the Constitution nor the
jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this Court with
any roving authority to decide federal questions that have not
been properly raised in adversary litigation.

On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court
of Illinois has incorrectly decided the federal question that was
presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judgment.
That duty could be performed by simply answering the question
decided below, without reaching the additional question on which
the Court orders reargument today.

It is, of course, a settled

canon of our constitutional jurisprudence that we do not decide
constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so to
resolve an actual case or controversy.
California Dept. of Corrections, 452

See e.g., Minnick v.

u.s.

105, 122-27 (1981).

Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal
question that has already been argued, the action it takes today
sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of the scope
of its powers.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 4, 1982
Re:

No. 81-430

Illinois v. Gates

Dear John:
I doubt the wisdom of adding the question you propose
for reargument in this case to the question already
formulated by Byron.
It seems to me we already have one
basis for reversal which seems to command a majority of
the Court; retrenching somewhat from Aguilar and Spinelli
and re-establishing Draper. The reason, as I understood
it, why you suggested the case should be re-argued if a
majority wished to reach the question now posed by Byron
was that the petitioner itself had requested an enlargement
of the questions presented to include that issue, and its
request had been denied by the Court. But I see no reason
for simply adding a "garden variety" probable cause issue
under the decision in Ross; I dare say there would be few,
if any, to grant certiorari in the first place if that were
all the case involved.
Sincerely~

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

.§u.prtmt <!Jourt of tqt ~tb .§tatts

'lllailqhtgton. ~. <!J.

2ll?J!~

CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 12, 1982

Re:No. 81-430 - ILLINOIS v. GATES
Dear John:

lI
I

Please join rre in your dissent circulated today.
Sincerely,

!

;jvt
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

81-430

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES, ET

ux.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[November-, 1982]
JUSTICE ·STEVENS, dissenting.
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the Illinois
Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the parties to address. That decision was consistent with the
Court's settled practice of not pennitting a party to advance
a ground for reversal that was not presented below. The reversal today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a flagrant departure from its settled practice, but also raises serious questions concerning the Court's management of its
certiorari jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the
Court;s decision to order reargument of this case.
I
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litigation are minimized and the decisional process is expedited if a
court is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. we set
a poor example for other judges when we suddenly reverse
our prior rulings in the same case.
On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorporate the following question:
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to obtain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v. Texas,
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378 U. S. 108 (1964), should the evidence obtained under
the warrant nevertheless be admitted at trial because
the police acted in a reasonable good faith belief in the
validity of the warrant?"
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that motion. On October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of
argument; they respected our decision and did not attempt to
argue the question of good faith. Today, the Court asks the
parties to reargue the case in order to address the very question it would not allow the parties to argue last month. This
type of inconsistent decisionmaking always imposes unnecessary costs on litigants and is wasteful of the judiciary's
most scarce resource--time.
II

As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally undesirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportunity to consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when
the basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which neither party adduced any evidence. Those considerations apply with special force when the judgment of the highest court
of a sovereign state is being reviewed. 2 Each of these con1
Of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an
alternative basis for affirming the decision below. E. g., Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240 n. 6 (1977).
'Writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 U. S. 437, JusTICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the Court's traditional
stance.
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues
raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions both before
[Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836)], Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311,
315 (1819), and since, e. g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., Inc., 360 U. S. 334, 342, n. 7 (1959); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160-163 (1945); McGoldrick v.
Compagnie General Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940); Whit-
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siderations applies to the additional question on which the
Court has ordered reargument. Neither party gave the Circuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate Court of Illinois,
Second District, or the Supreme Court of Illinois an opportunity to consider the question. Neither party offered any evidence concerning the state of mind of the magistrate when he
issued the warrant, the state of mind of the officers who obtained the warrant, or the state of mind of the officers who
executed the warrant. In short, the new issue was · not
"fairly presented" to the state courts. . Cf. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971).

III
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject toquestion. That question is serious whether one assumes that the
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question correctly or incorrectly.
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court of
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment.
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317
(1937). If the only federal question presented by a certiorari
petition is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legitiney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v. DesMoines, 173
U. S. 193, 197-201 (1899); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590
(1875).

*

*

*

"Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very likely to
be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in
mind." 394 U. S., at 438-439.
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 (1937); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474,483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S.
653, 677~2 (WHITE, J., concurring). See generally R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 (5th ed. 1978).
8
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit such as that filed by the police officer in this case.
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mate basis for reversal, this Court has no power to grant certiorari simply because it would like to address some other
federal question. For neither Article III of the Constitution
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this
Court with any roving authority to decide federal questions
that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation.
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court
of Illinois has incorrectly decid~d the federal question that
was presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judgment. That duty could be performed by simply answering
the question decided below, without reaching the additional
question on which the Court orders reargument today. It is,
of course, a settled canon of our constitutional jurisprudence
that we do not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so to resolve an actual case or controversy. See
e. g., Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S.
105, 122-127 (1981).

Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal
question that has already been argued, the action it takes today sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of the
scope of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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No. 81-430

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES, ET ux.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[November-, 1982] ·

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the Illinois
Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the parties to address. That decision was consistent with the
Court's settled practice of not permitting a party to advance
a ground for reversal that was not presented below. Thereversal today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a flagrant departure from its settled practice, but also raises serious questions concerning the Court's management of its
certiorari jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the
Court's decision to order reargument of this case.
I
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litigation are minimized and the decisional process is expedited if a
court is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. We set
a poor example for other judges when we suddenly reverse
our prior rulings in the same case.
On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorporate the following question:
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to ob-
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tain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U. S. 108 (1964), should the evidence obtained under
the warrant nevertheless be admitted at trial because
the police acted in a reasonable good faith belief in the
validity of the warrant?"
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that motion. On October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of
argument; they respected our decision and did not attempt to
argue the question of good faith. Today, the Court asks the
parties to reargue the case in order to address the very question it would not allow the parties to argue last month. This
type of inconsistent decisionmaking always imposes unnecessary costs on litigants and is wasteful of the judiciary's
most scarce resource-time.
II
As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally undesirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportunity to consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when
the basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which
neither party adduced any evidence. Those considerations
apply with added force when the judgment of the highest
court of a sovereign state is being reviewed. 2
Of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an
alternative basis for affirming the decision below. E. g., Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240 n. 6 (1977).
2
Writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 U. S. 437, JusTICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the Court's traditional
stance.
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions
both before [Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836)], Miller v.
Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 315 (1819), and since, e. g., Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. OklahomaRetailGrocersAssn., Inc., 360 U.S. 334,342, n. 7
(1959); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins . Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S.
1
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Each of these considerations applies to the additional question on which the Court has ordered reargument. Neither
party gave the Circuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, or the Supreme Court
of Illinois an opportunity to consider the question. Neither
party offered any evidence concerning the state of mind of
the magistrate when he issued the warrant, the state of mind
of the officers who obtained the warrant, or the state of mind
of the officers who executed the warrant. In short, the new
issue was not "fairly presented" to the state courts. Cf.
Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971).

III
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject to question. That question is serious whether one assumes that the
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question correctly or incorrectly.
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court of
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment.
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317
(1937). If the only federal question presented by a certiorari
154, 160-163 (1945); McGoldrick v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357, 362-363 (1927); Dewey v. DesMoines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-201
(1899); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).

*

*

*

"Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very
likely to be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those
questions in mind." 394 U. S., at 438-439.
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 (1937); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474,483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S.
653, 677-682 (1969) (WHITE, J., concurring). See generally R. Stern &
E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 (5th ed. 1978).
8
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit such as that filed by the police officer in this case.
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petition is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legitimate basis for reversal, this Court has no power to grant certiorari simply because it would like to address some other
federal question. For neither Article III of the Constitution
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this
Court with any roving authority to decide federal questions
that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation.
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court
of Illinois has incorrectly decided the federal question that
was presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judgment. That duty could be performed by simply answering
the question decided below, without reaching the additional
question on which the Court orders reargument today. It is,
of course, a settled canon of our constitutional jurisprudence
that we do not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so to resolve an actual case or controversy. See
e. g., Minnick v. Cal·ifornia Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S.
105, 122-127 (1981).

Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal
question that has already been argued, the action it takes
today sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of
the scope of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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information, suffi-

cient to provide probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant?
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I.
A.

Background

Facts
On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale (Illinois) police chief

received a handwritten letter in the mail.

The letter read, in

its entirety, as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple
in your town who~trictly make their ~ing on selling
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florid~where she lea ves it to be
loaded up with drugs, then L ~ce fl[ie]s down and
drives it back. Sue~l [ ie] s back after she drops the
~L ~
car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there
~
again and Lance will be fl l in~~~ n a few days to ~
drive it b~k. At the time Lance drives the c ar back
.
he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs.
Presently they~h ave over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in
their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work,
and make their entire living on pushers.
I guar[a]ntee if you watch them carefully you will
make a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs
dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Sue Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums.
The letter was entirely anonymous: it was unsigned and there was
no return address.

The police chief passed it on to a detective

in the department for investigation.
According to the Illinois Secretary of State's office, a
Lance B. Gates, living at 209D Dartmouth in Bloomingdale, had
been issued an Illinois driver's license.

The physical descrip-

tion given on the license indicated that Gates was a 30-year-old
male, 5'

ll~tall,

pounds.

A reliable

with brown eyes and hair, and weighing 220
"con ~ nt"

told police that a

Lance B. Gates, who had formerly lived at 209D Dartmouth, now
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lived at 198B Greenway Drive in Bloomingdale.

Further investiga-

tion revealed that an L. Gates had reserved a seat for May 5 on
Eastern Airlines flight 245 from Chicago to West Palm Beach,
Florida.

The call-back number on the reservation was 980-8427.

According to Illinois Bell Telephone Company records, this number
was issued to Lance Gates at 189B Greenway Drive in
Bloomingdale. 1
Pursuant to an arrangement with the Bloomingdale police,
a DEA agent observed all of the passengers boarding Eastern Airlines flight 245 on May 5.
Gates and
cense.

~bed

~e

passenger used the name Lance

the physical description from the driver's li-

Other DEA agents observed
the arrival of flight 245 in
.-'

West Palm Beach.
the , air~ rt

Holiday Inn.

The passenger identified as Gates remained in

for~ our,

then took a taxi to the West Palm Beach

There he entered a room

~egisteLed

in the name of

/susan Gates.
The following morning at 7:00, Gates and an unidentified

-

female left the Holiday Inn and entered a red and gray Mercury
bearing Illinois license RS8437.

~----------'-------

{This license number was issued

to Lance B. Gates for a 1975 Hornet station wagon.)

-

The two left

West Palm Beach in the Mercury on the northbound interstate highway.

The driving time from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale is

approximately 21-23 hours.
The police presented all of this information to an asso-

1 It is not clear whether 198B or 189B is the correct address.
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ciate judge of the county circuit court.

He granted a search

-------....

,.

warrant for the resps' residence and the Mercury they were driv-

i~g

fJom Florida.

At 5:15a.m. on May 7, resps arrived home

driving the Mercury.

-----

Police met them on arrival, served the

1. ~
~·

~

search warrant, and searched the car and home.

They discovered

350 pounds of marijuana in the car, and other incriminating evidence in both car and home.

B.

Decisions Below
Resps moved before trial to quash the search warrant and

suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search.

They

argued that the information provided by the anonymous letter,
even when coupled with the police corroboration of innocent details, was insufficient to provide probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
The

~p.

~

The TC granted the motion.

Ct. and

th~Ill.

s.ct. affirmed, each holding

that the warrant failed to comply with the requirements of
~guilar

v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

The affidavit in support

of the warrant had not satisfied either the "basis of knowledge"
or the "veracity" prong of the Aguilar test.

The "self-verifying

detail" doctrine of Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 410
(1969) , was not satisfied, and thus could not save the warrant.
Justice Moran, joined by Justice Underwood, dissented in
the Ill. S.Ct.

He argued that this case more closely resembled

Draper v. United States, 358 u.s. 307 (1959), than Aguilar or
Spinelli.

~

II.

Discussion

In working on this case, I cannot help remembering the
well-worn maxim that "hard cases make bad law."

I have read the

CHIEF JUSTICE's proposed dissent from denial of cert, arguing
that the decision below should be summarily reversed, and this
reinforces my concern.

As in almost all exclusionary rule cases,

the defendants are~ndeniably guilty--but that is obviously irrelevant.

What really makes this a hard case is the fact that

the police did
~

a~~utely nothin~
---~

....

wrong.

They made what appears

to have been an honest effort to investigate the anonymous tip,
verifying as much detail as they could in the time available.
They presented the results of their labors to a supposedly neutral and detached judicial officer to obtain a search warrant.
And they executed the warrant in an entirely reasonable manner.
It is almost offensive to see two large-scale drug dealers go
free because an associate judge of the county circuit court made
a mistake in issuing the warrant, but I think that any other
course would seriously erode the meaning of "probable cause."
Although I have noted your preliminary inclination to reverse, I
recommend that the decision below be affirmed.

A.

The Legal Standards
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378

u.s.

108 (1964), the police

obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peace on the basis of an affidavit claiming "reliable information from a credible person" that narcotics were illegally kept on the premises in
question.

The affidavit did not explain why the information was

•

reliable or the person credible.

The Court held that this was

inadequate, and announced a two-part

testt9f~~~

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay ~ for
mation ••. , the magistrate must be informed of QJlD some
of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed
they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances
from which the officer concluded that the informant •.•
was "credible" or his information "reliable."
Id.,

at~

as the

(footnote omitted).

Point [1] has come to be known

basis of knowledge" prong of the Aguilar test, and point

[2) as thev.:'veracity" prong.

v

Dicta in Spinelli v. United States, 393
relaxed the "basis of knowledge" prong slightly.

u.s.

410 (1969),

There the po-

lice were again relying on information from a known confidential
informant, and there was again
information.

~o indication of the source of his

The Court declared:

In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in
which the information was gathered, it is especially
important that the tip descrjbe the accused's criminal
activity in s~fficient detail that the magistrate may
k now-l~ at fi e 1s relYi ng-o n something more substantial
than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an ~
accusati~erely on an individual's general rep- ~
utation.
P~
Id., at 416.

./

~\

The Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.

307 (1959) , as an example of a case where the informant provided

information so detailed that a magistrate could reasonably infer
that it had been obtained in a reliable way.

The information in

Spinelli, however, was so general that it "could easily have been
obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar."
393 U.S., at 417.

detail" doctrine.

(-----------....;...-

This has been cited as the "self-verifying

(~~w~-r~~~)

Spinelli also considered the possibility that independent police investigation verifying portions of the informant's
information could be sufficient to save a tip that was inadequate
on its own.

The Court suggested that a tip that was partially

corroborated might be "as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's
""'-------

-

-

requirements when standing alone," id., at 416, but found that
such was not the case there.

The tipster had informed police

that the suspect was conducting illegal gambling operations in a
particular apartment with particular telephone numbers.

The in-

vestigation had revealed that the suspect regularly travelled to
the apartment, and that the telephones were located inside it.
In rejecting the government's argument, the Court declared:
At most, these [independent investigative efforts] indicated that [the suspect] could have used the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose.
This cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and
that he had made his charge against [the suspect] on
the basis of information obtained in a reliable way.
Id., at 417.

This situation was again contrasted with Draper,

where the police corroborated information so detailed that it
could only have been obtained by a person with an appropriate
basis of knowledge.

B.

The Informant's Basis of Information
Simply reading the letter that initiated the investiga-

tion here, supra page 2, it immediately strikes me that the sole
source of information was ~·rumor ~in the community. If I had to

~

guess the author's identity, I would say that she is a housewife ~
whose husband is a blue-collar laborer.

Although he works

~

hard, ~

~

1-o~
~.

they still have trouble making ends meet, so she resents the easy
wealth that she hears resps have acquired.
mere conjecture.

This is, of course,

Such a letter could just as easily have been

written by the victim of the Gates child's latest practical joke,
or someone playing a malicious practical joke on resps.
even a jealous business riva1. 2

Perhaps

The important fact here is that

nothing in the letter makes any of these possibilities unlikely.
Nor are they disproven by the additional evidence.

On the con-

trary, the police corroboration strengthens my belief that the
tipster's information was based on community rumor.
To begin with, it seems clear that the anonymous informant had no direct contact with resps.

Although (s)he knew that

resps lived "in the condominiums," this is not the specific sort
of information that someone with direct knowledge would have. 3
It "could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard
at a neighborhood bar."

Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 417.

last two paragraphs also smack of a rumor being repeated.

The
It is

very unlikely that the informant had seen any of the "big drugs
dealers who visit their house often" when (s)he does not know
which house is resps'.

And the letter does not sound as if it

were written by someone to whom resps would directly "brag about
the fact they never have to work."

2 If the author had known resps' address, I might have guessed
an irate neighbor upset by loud parties late at night.
3THE CHIEF JUSTICE states in his proposed dissent from denial
of cert that the letter gave resps' address. I assume he based
this statement on the pool memo, which makes the same error.

?

The strongest information in the letter is the part
characterized by the CHIEF JUSTICE as "a detailed description of
respondent[s'] method of operation."

I view the detail as the

sort that could easily be obtained through neighborhood gossip.
If the letter conveyed all of the information that the informant
had, gossip is the only likely source.

There is no specific de-

tail, such as the informant in Draper provided.

The letter was

obviously written with this particular trip in mind, but there is
no mention of the flight that Lance Gates would take, or even the
city in Florida that was involved.

The letter does not even men-

tion the type of drugs in which resps dealt.
figures sound like the product of rumor.

Even the dollar

$100,000 is a lot of

money, and would clearly seem staggering to anyone in the community.

But for a full-time drug dealer, the amount seems low.

It

is not a sum that would be stressed so heavily by someone who had
first-hand familiarity with the business. 4

In essence, the let-

ter here does nothing more than set out the bare outlines of a
simple, five-step
da.

~oce:s:

{1) Sue drives the car down to Flori-

{2) Sue flies back to Bloomingdale.

up with drugs."

{3) The car is "loaded

{4) Lance flies down to Florida.

drives the car back to Bloomingdale.

{5) Lance

I do not see enough there

4 In one of my cases last year, for example, the government arranged a controlled buy from a full-time dealer for well over
$100,000. This was a single sale on the street, and the dealer
tried to convince the undercover agent to take twice the amount-but the government did not have the funds. Evidence at trial
indicated that a delivery to "the stash" would be about two orders of magnitude higher.

~

to satisfy the Aguilar test.
The state argues th
rated enough details in
disageee.

In the first

..

were the least specific.
The police verified that resps lived
.___........._
"in the condominiums." They in fact learned the specific address
(although there was some disagreement between their confidential
informant and the telephone company) that someone with first-hand
knowledge of resps could easily have provided.

And they learned

that Lance was flying down to a city in Florida "a few days" after May 3.

Once again, the police obtained the specific informa-

/3J-

~

tion that someone with first-hand knowledge could have provided.~~
Even more important,

though,~as

the result of the po-

~
~r-

~

lice attempt to corroborate some of the slightly more specific
information.

Here they discovered that the anonymous

informant~•

had the rough idea (such as could be learned from neighborhood
rumor) but did not have it "quite right."

The informant, for

example, had said that Sue would drive the car down to Florida

~

~

~

~

on~

May 3, "leav [ e] it to be loaded up with drugs," and fly bac~~.,~~
The police never did verify how and when Sue and the car reache~
Florida, although the obvious inference is that she drove

d~

some point.

But she did not "dro[p] the car off," and "leav[e]
.....
it to be loaded up with drugs," nor did she fly back back to Chi-

cago while Lance drove the car.

Even with corroboration, the

letter does not satisfy the "basis of information" prong of the
Aguilar test.

bench memo: Illinois v. Gates

c.

page 11.

The Informant's Veracity
Under Aguilar, the magistrate issuing the warrant must

be able to conclude that the informant was "credible" and his
information "reliable."

As an example, the Aguilar Court specif-

ically endorsed the affidavit in Jones v. United States, 362
257, 267 n.2 (1960).

u.s.

That affidavit told the commissioner that

the informant had provided reliable information in the past, and
that the information in question had also been obtained from other sources.

~~

378 U.S., at 114 & n.S.

Here, in contrast, there <i s--rtOthing

o indicate that the

~

author of the anonymous letter is credibl , or that his/her in- ~
~

formation is reliable.

The state a;gues that a "citizen infer-

mant" should be presumed reliable, since there is no apparent
motive to lie.

It cites cases in which crime victims, eye-

witnesses, or witnesses sought out by the police have given information that has been found acceptable.

But these are all

cases in which witnesses' identities were known to the police,
and the witnesses were known to have been in a position to obtain
the information on which the police relied.
anonymous tipster.

None involved an

Although the state may be correct to say that

there was no apparent motive for a "citizen informant" to lie,
this is only because nothing 5 is apparent about the informant.
There was also no apparent motive to tell the truth.

There are

numerous possible motives to lie, and the anonymous letter pro-

5The state frequently stresses his/her citizenship, but even
this is conjecture.

vides the perfect opportunity to do so without fear of responsibility.

Furthermore, even if the state is correct, its argument

could prove only that the informant thought (s)he was telling the
truth.

There is no reason to suppose that (s)he in fact knew the

truth.

Perhaps (s)he honestly believed that anyone travelling to

Florida was a drug dealer.
The state also argues that the suspicious circumstances
of the trip tended to show that the letter was credible.

The

argument is essentially that resps satisfied a "drug courier profile" like the one at issue in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146.
This is ridiculous.

The only suspicious aspect of the trip was

~~ ~apid turn-aro~nd, 6
tions for that.

and there are many

possibl~explana

There was no suggestion that Lance paid for his

trip in cash, or carried little luggage.

Other circumstances

also tend to indicate that the trip was legitimate.

Unlike al-

most every drug courier profile case, Lance travelled under his
own name, and gave the airline his proper telephone number.

He

did not rush out of the airport in West Palm Beach, but waited an
hour before leaving.
under her own name.

Susan had registered in the Holiday Inn
The car's license plates were issued to

Lance in his own name. 7

In sum, resps did not fit any rational

6Note that Susan did not necessarily have a rapid turn-around.
Even if the letter is correct on this point, she at least spent a
few days in Florida--much longer than would be needed simply to
pick up drugs.
7 The discrepancy between the Mercury, which resps were driving,
and the Hornet, for which the plates were issued, may indicate
some illegality, but it does not indicate drug-running.

"drug courier profile."

Furthermore, even if they did, that

would not necessarily provide probable cause.

In most of the

drug courier profile cases, the courts have held at best that
conformity with the profile provided articulable suspicion justifying a limited intrusion--not probable cause justifying an arrest or search.
Even with corroboration that the police were able to
obtain, the letter does not satisfy the "veracity" prong of the
Aguilar test.

D.

The Context of the Case
The principal difficulty I have with this case is the

context in which the issue is presented to the Court.

The ques-

tion, unfortunately, is not whether the police acted reasonably.
I think they

~~id.

The question is whether there was

probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and
this is a different issue.
The Court denied the state's motion to amend or enlarge
the question presented to include the issue of a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule.

The amicii nevertheless

brief the point, so I will mention it here.

In this situation

the exclusionary rule does not serve any direct deterrent purpose.

Indeed, the police should not be deterred from presenting

their evidence to a neutral magistrate to obtain a search warrant.

But if the exclusionary rule did not apply in these cir-

cumstances, the magistrate's decision--made in an ex parte
proceeding--would be effectively isolated from appellate review.

?

~~A..

There would then be a real risk that some

magistrates~uld

come little more than "rubber stamps" for police requests.
Court should take care to prevent such a result.

beThe

See Aguilar,

supra, 378 U.S., at 111 ("[T]he court must still insist that the
magistrate perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not
serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.").
Concluding that the circumstances presented here were
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause would also have
far-reaching consequences.

I have no doubt that the police had

articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a limited investigatory stop. 8 This would have been a very different case if the
police had approached resps and asked them what they were carrying in their trunk.

If probable cause were determined on a con-

tinuum, this would also be a different case.

I do not argue that

it was necessarily "unreasonable" for the police to make the limited intrusion that was made here.
jected such balancing tests.
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).

But the Court has always re-

See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442

It is therefore not enough that the

police may have had sufficient cause to justify a very limited
search.

They conducted a search requiring a warrant, and as a

result "probable cause" is required.

If the Court relaxes the

standards of probable cause here, it relaxes them in the context

8 The state relies heavily on Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972), claiming that there was less evidence of probable cause
there than here. Williams, however, was initially a Terry-stop
case. It was only after the officer discovered a weapon that
there was probable cause to justify the arrest and the search
that revealed the drugs.

7
1

of a much more intrusive search.

It even relaxes them in the

context of an arrest, for although the conclusions justifying
search and arrest warrants are different, each must be supported
by the same level of probable cause.
ford Daily, 436

u.s.

See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stan-

547, 556 n.6 (1978).

The evidence here sup-

ported the conclusion that resps were guilty more strongly than
it supported the conclusion that there would be drugs in the car
and house, but it seems clear that, prior to the discovery of the
marijuana, the police did not have probable cause to arrest resps
at 5:15 a.m.

Yet the legal standard is theoretically the same.

III.

Conclusion

The proper disposition of this case would have been to
deny cert.

It is little more than a factual dispute over the

application of the Aguilar principles.
Draper.

~

It is not governed by

An affirmance will simply establish that Aguilar retains

is precedential force, clarifying that a totally anonymous tipster is not a better source of information than a confidential
informant known to the police.

A reversal, on the other hand,

could seriously undermine the meaning of "probable
not only searches, but also arrests, easier to obtain on the basis of community rumor.
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WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS

~~ ~

[April-, 1983]
1

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for vi.- _. IJ 0
olation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a
~
search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraband
_./)
r /J ~
in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gates
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The
~ ~ Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit sub~
d .in support of the State's application for a warrant to
search the Gates's property was inadequate under this
.-lu ..,._ LV
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964)
1-/,{4.A
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).
_ .1J tJ • /7-dA.bt __...
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the
~ ., ....-- Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search
- 11
/J I- dPAl
warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous
~) informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral ariA--(_ (l~J V,
gument on this question, however, we requested the parties
to address an additional question:
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
./ _
1
~

Q

r

t-r,Z

I I 1983
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that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with
the Fourth Amendment."
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari,
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not
addressin~ question regar mg modificatiOn of the exclusionary rule
er of November 29, 1982,

-'tL

s:==:.

I
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari,
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23,
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of
§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these requirements do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch. 344
(1809). 1
'The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim
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More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309
U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), the Court observed:
But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts, that it considers questions urged by a
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the
courts below. . . . In cases coming here from state
courts in which a state statute is assailed as unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should
lead us to refrain from deciding questions not presented
or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial
action we are called upon to review. Apart from thereluctance with which every court should proceed to set
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented, due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to
consider and decide questions affecting the validity of
state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for
these reasons that this Court, where the constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in the state court, consistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not
raised or decided in that court.
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional character of the rule against our deciding claims "not pressed nor
passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 160 (1945), where
have been both raised and addressed in state court was generally not understood in the literal fashion in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson
& F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 60
(1951). Instead, the Court developed the rule that a claim would not be
considered here unless it had been either raised or squarely considered and
resolved in state court. See, e. g., McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale,
309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Duel,
324 u. s. 154, 160 (1945).
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v.
California, 401 U. S. 797, 805--806 (1971).
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not ressed or
passed upon below" rule as me~ely a prudentraf restriction.
In 1'ermintetlo v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court reversed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v.
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 479, n. 3, that it possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court
the question on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so connected with it in substance as to form but another ground or
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued.
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely
2
In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented
below and those involving entirely new questions.
The a lication of these principles in the instant case is not
eJ.lt4rely_ strmghtforwar .
£ fs -clear in 1li1s case- thatr espondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated by the actions of the Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be excluded from their
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been
violated. T~ver, however, raised or addressed
the question whether the federal excluswnar rule should
be m'o 1 e m any respect, and none of the opinions of the
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was
considered.
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2,
38 Stat . .790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court toreview state court decisions even when a claimed federal right
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the assessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant argued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not received personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising
from a single factual occurrence, the two claims "are not in anywise necessarily connected," i d. , at 198. Because of this , we concluded that appellant's taking claim could not be considered.
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have challenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are
those on which the record is ·very likely to be inadequate
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969).
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges modification of an existing constitutional right or accompanying
remedy. Here, for example, the record contains little, if
anything, regarding the sp.bjective good faith of the police officers that searched the Ghtes's property - which might well
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the
modification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit
from a record containing such facts.
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie
Generale, 309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), demands that those
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important,
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an adequate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra,
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions indicate, see - - , supra, or prudential, as several of
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere we
need not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may be,
consideration of the question presented in our order of November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifications for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we
thus decide not to pass on the issue.
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the
federal exclusionary rule-suppressing evidence against respondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morrison v.
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to consider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's contract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that without such a contest, the routine restatement and application of
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amendment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modified rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary

?
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to apprise the state court of the arguments for not applying
the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the question
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated opposition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally" and not "a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved.. " United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980);
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modification or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for
purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the
State courts.
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against
our considering the question presented in our order of November 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Sufficient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971)
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(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., ~en~t·:n
· ewer v. Williams,
430 U. S. 387, 413-414 (1977t~OWELL, J. concurring); Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 42Q, 437;-< 3-444 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion.
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual
record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the framing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts,
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our customary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are rendered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions.
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates
that we reserve for another day the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
II
We now turn to the question presented in the State's original petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the search of their car
and house. A chronological statement of events usefully introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in
your town who strictly make their living on selling
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.
Most of their buys are done in Florida where she leaves
it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and
drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off
in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and
Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back.
At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and
make their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums"
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the
Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who
decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of
the Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license
had been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant, whose examination of certain financial records revealed a more recent address for the Gates, and he also
learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that
"L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight
245 to West Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 4:15 p.m.
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and
that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition,
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale
was approximately 22 to 24 hours.
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, /
and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage ;(
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The
j~ge of that court thereupon issued a search warrantJ.or the
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the
modus operandi of the Gates had been substantially corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had
headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had flown
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his wife, returned to their
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left
West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mer-

9.£)_,. ,
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cury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana.
A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons,
and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe that the
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are inclined
to~ee-that standin aiOne,the anon ous letter sent to
the Bloomingdale Police Department WQuld not prg.,vide the
basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States,
290 u. s. 41 (1933).
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that
Detective Mader's affidavit r@ght b~f s~ment
in~ter with information Sl:iffiCleilt topermit a determination of probable cause. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit
in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sustain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court applied-a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in
(_____ S:);;l!!J. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 3 The Illinois
sIn Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a
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Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood
Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each
of two independent requirements before it could be relied on.
J. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as sup lemented by Mader's affidavit, first had to equate reveal _A'
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter writer-t e particular
means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this particular case.
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been
particular apartment, which the telephone company said contained two
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a
confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers submitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his constitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some
of the underlying circumstances" indicating that "the informant . . . was
'credible"' or that "his information [was] 'reliable."' Aguilar, supra, 378
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Aguilar's requirement
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that : .. narcotics were where he claimed they were. We
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient detail" to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or
an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393
U. S., at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, however, that the tip lacked the requisite detail to permit this "self-verifying
detail" analysis.
• See, e. g., Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In summary, these rules posit that the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test has
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satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because, "there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing] that
the anonymous person [that wrote the letter to the
Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible." J. A., at
7a. The court indicated that corroboration by police of details contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity"
prong, and in any event, could not do so if, as in the present
case, only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A., at 12.
In addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its
writer's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois
court understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained
in a tip to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable
basis for his statements, but it thought that the anonymous
letter failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable
cause had been made.
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant~ty," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are

-----

two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his information. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong. Both the "basis of knowledge"
prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as entirely separate requirements, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sustain a determination of probable cause. See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements.
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "veracity" prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not capable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity"
prong. I d., at 12a.
The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test" observes that "[t]he built-in
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, that a slipshod application calls
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote
omitted)." The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve
analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting." I d., at 857.
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hi hly r:elevant in determining the value of his report.
o not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements
to be rigidly exacted in every case, 5 which the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed
below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular
place.
III

The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have assumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision,
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra.
6
Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause,
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In
Aguilar, we required only that:
the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that ... narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which
the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his information 'reliable."' Id., at 114 (emphasis added).
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentalization of the inquiries into an informant's "veracity," "reliability'' and "basis
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an informant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two particular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v.
United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to believe the
defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income taxes. We com5
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any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every
informant's tip. Perhaps the c·e ntral teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a
"practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). "In dealing with probable
cause, ... as the very name implies, wedeafwffi1prohabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual andpractical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." I d., at 175. Our
observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable
to the probable cause standard:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in
mented that:
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires
that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable him to
make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently
supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal
process ." Id., at 224-225 (emphasis added).
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many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons.
As we said in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972),
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to
a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation."
lbid. 7
The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the totality of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257,
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip.
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petitioners at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of
probable cause.
Likewise, in Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), we upheld a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment.
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home.
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable,
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs.
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that information within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment
provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there.
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police Ker
and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached Ker's car,
and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's modus
operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. Moreover,
when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy he
managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U-turn. Finally, the police had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable informa7
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Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two
largely independent channels-the informant's "veracity" or
"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according
these two elements such independent status. Instead, they
are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra,
407 U. S., at 146-147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573
(1971).

If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles
tion previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that his
source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence of
information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers that
Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in understatement." !d., at 36.
8
Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reasoning that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted
police-affiant."
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his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips/ with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its
9

Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, reflect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed robbery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invalidated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun.
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifically described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above described premises appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant issued on
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because "There is no indication as
to how the informant or for that matter any other person could tell whether
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar
or salt." Id., at 689.
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant,
stated to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant
supplied police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli.
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usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under
circumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we
said that "the quanta . . . of proof'' appropriate in ordinary
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause."
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Pro~ft
1972).
___,
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108.
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City ofTampa,
407 U. S. 345, 348-350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that
many warrants are-quite properly, ibid.-issued on the
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more
formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the context in
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v.
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "two-

I

81-430-0PINION
ILLINOIS v. GATES

21

pronged test" are particularly troubling.
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination
of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants," Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." ld.,
at 109.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate,
police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search.
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1, 9 (1977). R~ this preference for the warrant m:_ocess, the traditional standard for review of an issuin magistrate's pro .2 e cause e ermination has been that so long as
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]"
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation
We also have said that "Although in a particular caee it may not be
easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
10
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of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more consistent with
our traditional deference to the probable cause determinations of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test."
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli
poorly serves "the most basic function of any government":
"to provide for the security of the individual and of his property." "Without the reasonably effective performance of the
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged
test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Committee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise,
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes."
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants,"
Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S. 1 at 109. This reflects both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not,
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli.
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While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard
that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is not.
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-m:o%e~),est" establisliea 6y our dec1s1ons in
Aguilar and Spinel i. 1 ~n its place we reaffirm the totality
of the circumstan.ses analysis that traditionally lias informed
probable cause determinations. See Jones v. United States,
supra; United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United
States, supra. The task of the issuin rna ·stra e is simply
to make a ractical, common-sense decision whether, given .
all the circumstances set orth m the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. Jones v. United States,
supra, 362 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this fiexiThe Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN,
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 58fr-586 (1971), noted
his long-held view "that Spinelli ... was wrongly decided" by this Court.
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Likewise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli formulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 41.04 (1981).
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would,
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause,
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a useful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its
language.
11
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ble, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed
from Aguilar and Spinelli.
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn
statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does
believe that" liquor illegally brought into the United States is
located on certain premises will not do. Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining
the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that "affiants have received
reliable information from a credible person and believe" that
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli.
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
IV
Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analy-
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sis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent
police work. In Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U. S., at
269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to
say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may
rely upon information received through an informant, rather
than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's
statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the -erobative value of corroborative efforts of~e officials in Aguilar the sourceortlle "two-pronged test"-by
observing that if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirel~ different
case" would have been presented. Agutrar: supra, 378
U. S., at 109, n. 1.
Our decision in ~er v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959), however, is the classic case on the value of corroborative efforts of police officrals. There, an lnforman( named
Here~raper would arrive in Denver on a
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown
slacks and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast."
/d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his
information. '2
12
The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only reference to Hereford's reliability was that he had "been engaged as a 'special
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money,
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no
indication of how Draper came by his information. At most, the detailed
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On one of the stated dates police officers observed a man
matching this description exit a train arriving from Chicago;
his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report and he was
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point
in his investigation, the arresting officer "had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had
the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And
surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable
grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information-that Draper would have the heroin with
him-was likewise true," id., at 313.
The showing of probable cause in the present case was. fully
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone, the
facts obtained through the indep~ n of
Mader and the EA at east suggested that the Gates were
inv~~ng. In aod1tlon to oeing a popular
vacatiOn site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA,
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by_Mader's
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford obtained his information, it was reliable.
3
' The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details contained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corrobo-
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Court of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant
who had given reliable information on previous occasions,
while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police.
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time the police department received the anonymous letter, it became far
less significant after Mader's independent investigative work
occurred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that
the Gates's car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would
fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive
the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also
were true. "Because an informant is right about some
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli,
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring}-including
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to
ration of innocent activity," J . A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in
the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,
36 (1963).
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to
require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands.
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable
cause. See Brown v. Texas , 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a
determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.
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satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we
think it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that
"corroboration through other sources of information reduced
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v.
United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 269, 271.
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details
relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate
information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves,
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gates's alleged illegal activities. Of course,
the Gates's travel plans might have been learned from a talkative neighbor or travel agent; under the "two-pronged test"
developed from Spinelli, the character of the details in the
anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear
inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of knowledge."
But, as discussed previously, supra, - - , probable cause
does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that the
writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his entire story
either from the Gates or someone they trusted. And
corroboration of major portions of the letter's predictions
provides just this probability. It is apparent, therefore, that
the judge issuing the warrant had a "substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search the Gates's home
and car existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be
Reversed.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The fact that Lance and Sue Gates made a 22-hour nonstop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Bloomingdale,
Illinois, only a few hours after Lance had flown to Florida
provided persuasive evidence that they were engaged in illicit activity. That fact, however, was not known to the
magistrate when he issued the warrant to search their home.
What the magistrate did know at that time was that the
anonymous informant had not been completely accurate in his
or her predictions. The informant had indicated that "Sue
drives their·car to Florida where she leaves it to be loaded up
with drugs . . . . Sue flies back after she drops the car off in
Florida." App. la (emphasis added). Yet Detective
Mader's affidavit reported that she "left the West Palm
Beach area driving the Mercury northbound." App. 12a.
The discrepancy between the informant's predictions and
the facts known to Detective Mader is significant for three
reasons. First, it cast doubt on the informant's hypothesis
that the Gates already had "over $100,000 worth of drugs in
their basement," App. la. The informant had predicted an
itinerary that always kept one spouse in Bloomingdale, suggesting that the Gates did not want to leave their home unguarded because something valuable was hidden within.
That inference obviously could not be drawn when it was
known that the pair was actually together over a thousand
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miles from home.
Second, the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct seem
substantially less unusual than the informant had predicted it
would be. It would have been odd if, as predicted, Sue had
driven down to Florida on Wednesday, left the car, and flown
right back to Illinois. But the mere facts that Sue was in
West Palm Beach with the car/ that she was joined by her
husband at the Holiday Inn on Friday, 2 and that the couple
drove north together the next morning-1 are not probative of
any unusual behavior at all.
Third, the fact that the anonymous letter contained a material mistake undermines the reasonableness of relying on it as
a basis for making a forcible entry into a private home.
Of course, the activities in this case did not stop when the
magistrate issued the warrant. The Gates drove all night to
1
The anonymous note suggested that she was going down on Wednesday, App. 1a, but for all the officers knew she had been in Florida for a
month. App. 10b-13b.
2
Lance does not appear to have behaved suspiciously in flying down to
Florida. He made a reservation in his own name and gave an accurate
home phone number to the airlines. Compare Florida v. Royer, - U. S. - - , - - , n. 2 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544,
548 (1980) (Stewart, J ., announcing the judgment). And Detective
Mader's affidavit does not report that he did any of the other things drug
couriers are notorious for doing, such as paying for the ticket in cash,
Royer, supra, at - - , n. 2, dressing casually, ibid., looking pale and nervous , ibid.; Mendenhall, supra, at 548, improperly filling out baggage
tags, Royer, supra, at - -, n. 2, carrying American Tourister luggage,
ibid., not carrying any luggage, Mendenhall, supra, at 564-565 (PowELL, J., concurring in part and- concurring in the judgment), or changing
airlines en route, ibid.
8
Detective Mader's affidavit hinted darkly that the couple had set out
upon "that interstate highway commonly used by travelers to the Chicago
area. " But the same highway is also commonly used by travelers to Disney World, Sea World, and Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus World. It is also the road to Cocoa Beach, Cape Canaveral, and Washington, D.C. I would venture that each year dozens of perfectly innocent
people fly to Florida, meet a waiting spouse, and drive off together in the
family car.
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Bloomingdale, the officers searched the car and found 400
pounds of marijuana, and then they searched the house. 4
However, none of these subsequent events may be considered in evaluating the warrant, 5 and the search of the house
was legal only if the warrant was valid. Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U. S. 30, 33-35 (1970). I cannot accept the Court's casual conclusion that, before the Gates arrived in Bloomingdale, there was prob~ble cause to justify a valid entry and
search of a private home. No one knows who the informant
in this case was, or what motivated him or her to write the
note. Given that the note's predictions were faulty in one
significant respect, and were corroborated by nothing except
ordinary innocent activity, I must surmise that the Court's
evaluation of the warrant's validity has been colored by subsequent events. 6
Although the foregoing analysis is determinative as to the
• The officers did not enter the unoccupied house as soon as the warrant
issued; instead, they waited until the Gates returned. It is unclear
whether they waited because they wanted to execute the warrant without
unnecessary property damage or because they had doubts about whether
the informant's tip was really valid. In either event their judgment is to
be commended.
• It is a truism that "a search warrant is valid only if probable cause has
been shown to the magistrate and that an inadequate showing may not be
rescued by post-search testimony on information known to the searching
officers at the time of the search." Rice v. Wolff, 513 F . 2d 1280 (CA8
1975). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 450-451 (1971);
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565, n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498
(1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486 (1958); Taylor v.
United States , 286 U. S. 1, 6 (1932); Agnello v. United States , 269 U. S.
20, 33 (1925).
6
Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), affords no support for
today's holding. That case did not involve an anonymous informant. On
the contrary, as the Court twice noted, Mr. Hereford was "employed for
that purpose and [his] information had always been found accurate and reliable." Id., at 313; see id., at 309. In this case, the police had no prior
experience with the informant, and some of his or her information in this
case was unreliable and inaccurate.
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house search, the car search raises additional issues because
"there is a constitutional difference between houses and
cars." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). Cf.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 589-590 (1980). An officer who has probable cause to suspect that a highly movable
automobile contains contraband does not need a valid warrant in order to search it. This point was developed in our
opinion in United States v. Ross, - - U. S. - - (1982),
which was not decided until after the Illinois Supreme Court
rendered its decision in this case. Under Ross, the car
search may have been valid if the officers had probable cause
after the Gates arrived.
In apologizing for its belated realization that we should not
have ordered reargument in this case, the Court today shows
high regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to
state courts. Ante, at 6. When the Court discusses the
merits, however, it attaches no weight to the conclusions of
the Circuit Judge of DuPage County, Illinois, of the three
judges of the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court, ·
or of the five justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, all of
whom concluded that the warrant was not based on probable
cause. In a fact-bound inquiry of this sort, the judgment of
three levels of state courts, all of whom are better able to
evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous informants in
Bloomingdale, Illinois, than we are, should be entitled to at
least a presumption of accuracy. 7 I would simply vacate the
The Court holds that what were heretofore considered two independent "prongs"-"veracity" and "basis of knowledge"-are now to be considered together as circumstances whose totality must be appraised. A nte,
at 18. "A deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some
other indicia of reliability." Ibid. Yet in this case, the lower courts found
neither factor present. App. 12a. And the supposed "other indicia" in
the affidavit take the form of activity that is not particularly remarkable.
I do not understand how the Court can find that the "totality'' so far exceeds the sum of its "circumstances."
7
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judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remand the case
for reconsideration in the light of our intervening decision in
United States v. Ross.
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a
search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraban
in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gate '
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit submitted in support of the State's application for a warrant to
search the Gates's property was inadequate under this
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964)
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search
warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous
informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this question, however, we requested the parties
to address an additional question:
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
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that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with
the Fourth Amendment."
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari,
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not
addressing the question regarding modification of the exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982,
-U.S.-.
I

Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari,
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23,
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of
§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these requirements do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch. 344
(1809). 1
1

The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim
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More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309
U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), the Court observed:
But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts, that it considers questions urged by a
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the
courts below. . . . In cases coming here from state
courts in which a state statute is assailed as unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should
lead us to refrain from deciding questions not presented
or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial
action we are called upon to review. Apart from thereluctance with which every court should proceed to set
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented, due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to
consider and decide questions affecting the validity of
state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for
these reasons that this Court, where the constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in the state court, consistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not
raised or decided in that court.
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional character of the rule against our deciding claims "not pressed nor
passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 160 (1945), where
have been both raised and addressed in state court was generally not understood in the literal fashion in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson
& F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 60
(1951). Instead, the Court developed the rule that a claim would not be
considered here unless it had been either raised or squarely considered and
resolved in state court. See, e. g., McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate,
309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Duel,
324 u. s. 154, 160 (1945).
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v.
California, 401 U. S. 797, 805--806 (1971).
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction.
In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court reversed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v.
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 479, n. 3, that it possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court
the question on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so connected with it in substance as to form but another ground or
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued.
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely
In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in
2
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented
below and those involving entirely new questions.
The application of these principles in the instant case is not
entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated by the actions of the Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be excluded from their
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been
violated. The State never, however, raised or addressed
the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should
be modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was
considered.
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2,
38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court to review state court decisions even when a claimed federal right
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the assessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant argued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not received personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising
from a single factual occurrence, the two claims "are not in anywise necessarily connected," id., at 198. Because of this, we concluded that appellant's taking claim could not be considered.
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have challenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are
those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969).
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges moQ.l.:o·----~
fication of an existing constitutional right or
panying
remedy. Here, for exam
contains little, if
anything, regarding th subjectiv good faith of the police officers that searched the
' roperty-which might well
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the
modification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit
from a record containing such facts.
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie
Generale, 309 U. S. 430, 435-436 (1940), demands that those
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important,
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an adequate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra,
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions indicate, see - - , supra, or prudential, as several of
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhert!)
w~ not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may
be, conSRteratlon of the question presented in our order of
November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifications for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we
thus decide not to pass on the issue.
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the
federal exclusionary rule-suppressing evidence against respondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morris on v.
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to consider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's contract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that without such a contest, the routine restatement and application of
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amendment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modified rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary

1
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to apprise the state court of the arguments for not applying
the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the question
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated opposition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judi~
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend
ment rights generally" and not)'a personal constitutiona
right of the party aggrieved." VUnited States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980);
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modification or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for
purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the
State courts.
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against
our considering the question presented in our order of November 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Sufficient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971)
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(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U. S. 387, 413-414 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring); Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437, 443-444 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion.
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual
record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the framing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts,
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our customary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are rendered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions.
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates
that we reserve for another day the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
II

We now turn to the question presented in the State's original petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the search of their car
and house. A chronological statement of events usefully introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in
your town who strictly make their living on selling
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it
back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance
will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At
the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and
make their entire living on pushers.
I gurut,)ltee if you watch them carefully you will make
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums"
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who decided
to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had
been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address
in Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant,
whose examination of certain financial records revealed a
more recent address for the Gates, and he also learned from a
police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates" had
made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West
Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May
5 at 4:15 p.m.
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug
Eiiforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and
that, at 7:00a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition,
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale
was approximately 22 to 24 hours.
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts,
and subm1 te~ aj udg:~ o ~ 1rcm ou o u age
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The
judge of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the
modus operandi of the Gates had been substantiall co- oborat .
s e anonymous e ter predicted, Lance Gates had
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had
headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hoUJS after he had flown
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, ana hfs wife, returned to their
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left
West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana.

r
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A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons,
and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe that the
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
The Illinois~u
~me-eo~oncluded-and we are inclined
to agree-th standin alone{ th~er sent to
the Bloomingda e -olice Department would noJ J2rovide_the
basis for a rna "strate's determin tion that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States,
290 u. s. 41 (1933).
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that
Detective Mader's affidavit might bec apa6Ieof supplementing tfielilionymous Ietter with information sufficient to permita determmationof probable cause. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit
in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sustain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 3 The Illinois
In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a
particular apartment, which the telephone company said contained two
3
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~PTl;!me::::::fYourt,

like some others, apparently understood
Sp elli
requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each
1'11'--hxl'l"' mdependent requirements before it could be relied on.
J. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter l!_S su lemented by Mader's affidavit, first had t;;,-~~ reveal
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter wr~rticula
means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this particular case.
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a
confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers submitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his constitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some
of the underlying circumstances" indicating that "the informant . . . was
'credible'" or that "his information [was] 'reliable.'" Aguilar, supra, 378
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Aguilar's requirement
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that ... narcotics were where he claimed they were. We
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient detail"
to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393 U. S.,
at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, however, that
the tip lacked the requisite detail to permit this "self-verifying detail"
analysis.
• See, e. g. , Stanley v. State , 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In summary, these rules posit that the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test has

81-430--0PINION
14

ILLINOIS v. GATES

satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because, "there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing] that
the anonymous person k\V ho ote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police Departmentr was credible." J. A., at 7a. The
court indicated that corroboration by police of details contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong,
and in any event, could not do so if, as in the present case,
only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A., at 12. In
addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois court
understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip
to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference.
Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had
been made.
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informa~'s ~eracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge»ire
two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his information. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong. Both the "basis of knowledge"
prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as entirely separate requirements, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sustain a determination of probable cause. See n: 5, infra. Some ancillary
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements.
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "veracity" prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not capable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity''
prong. Id., at 12a.
The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test" observes that "[t]he built-in
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, that a slipshod application calls
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote
omitted)." The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve
analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting." I d., at 857.
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all highly relevant in determining the value of his report.
W£,do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and inde endent re uirements
to e r1g1 y e ac e m every case, 5 which the opinion of the
Supreme "Court orTIImois would imply. ..fuill!_er, as detailed
below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsen8e,Practical quesbon whether there is "probable cause" to
bet1eve that co:rlti'a6and or evidence is located in a particular
place.
III
This totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause 6 than is
The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have assumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision,
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra.
6
Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause,
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In
Aguilar, we required only that:
the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which
the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" !d., at 114 (emphasis added).
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentalization of the inquiries into an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an informant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two particular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v.
United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to believe the
defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income taxes. We com5
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any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every
informant's tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions be~ring on the probable cause stan ard is t atjt is a
"practical, nontechniCal conceRUon.'' iirinegar v. United
,1
9). "In dealing with probable
Sta es,
cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." I d., at 175. Our
observation in United States v. G.!l.rtez, 449 U. S. 411, 418
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable
to the probable cause standard: '
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.
As these comments illustrate, p~ concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
fiiCfiial contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in
mented that:
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires
that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable him to
make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently
supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal
process." Id., at 224-225 (emphasis added).
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many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons.
As we said in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972),
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to
a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation."
lbid. 7
7
The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the totality of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257,
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip.
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petitioners at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of
probable cause.
Likewise, in Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), the Court
upheld a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment.
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home.
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable,
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs.
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that information within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment
provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there.
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police observed Ker and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached
Ker's car, and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's
modus operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. Moreover, when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy
he managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U-turn. Finally, the
police had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable in-
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Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two
largely independent channels-the informant's "veracity" or
"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according
these two elemen ts strch maependenrstatus. Instead", they
are better unae:fStoo<taS releVant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra,
407 U. S., at 146-147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573
(1971).
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
statement that the., event was observed first-hand, entitles
formation previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that
his source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence
of information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in understatement." Id., at 36.
8
Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reasoning that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted
police-affiant."
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his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, 9 with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its
• Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, reflect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed robbery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invalidated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun.
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifically described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above described premises appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant issued on
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because "There is no indication as
to how the informant or for that matter any other person could tell whether
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar
or salt." !d., at 689.
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant,
stated to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant
supplied police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli.
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usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under
circumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we
said that "the quanta ... of proof'' appropriate in ordinary
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause."
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft
1972).
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108.
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U. S. 345, 348--350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that
many warrants are-quite properly, ibid.-issued on the
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more
formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the context in
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v.
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "two-
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pronged test" are particularly troubling.
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination
of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants," Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not invalidate ... warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." Id.,
at 109.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate,
police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search.
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1, 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]"
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation
10
We also have said that "Although in a particular case it may not be
easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
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of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more consistent with
our traditional deference to the probable cause determinations of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test."
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli
poorly serves "the most basic function of any government":
"to provide for the security of the individual and of his property." "Without the reasonably effective performance of the
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged
test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Committee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise,
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes."
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants,"
Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 109. This reflects both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not,
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli.
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While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard
that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is not.
For all these reasons, we conclude that i~~n
don the "two- ron ed test" established by our decisions in
Aguilar an Spmelli. 11 n 1 s p e we reaffirm the totality
of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations. See Jones v. United States,
supra; United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime""W!ll Ee found m a parbcufiir
Rlace. And the auty of a reVIewmg co\frt 1S S1mpiy to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. Jones v. United States,
supra, 362 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this fl.exi11
The Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN,
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 585--586 (1971), noted
his long-held view "that Spinelli ... was wrongly decided" by this Court.
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Likewise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli formulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 41.04 (1981).
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would,
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause,
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a useful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its
language.

t
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ble, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed
from Aguilar and Spinelli.
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn
statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does
believe that" liquor illegally brought into the United States is
located on certain premises will not do. Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining
the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that "affiants have received
reliable information from a credible person and believe" that
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli.
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
IV
Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analy-
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sis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of
corroboration of details ofanTri1'ormant's tip by independent
police work. Tn Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U. S., at
269, we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be
deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to
say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may
rely upon information received through an informant, rather
than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's
statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials in Aguilar-the source of the "two-pronged test"-by
observing that if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different
case" would have been presented. Aguilar, supra, 378
U. S., at 109, n. 1.
Our decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959), however, is the cfassic case on the value of corroborative efforts of police officials. There, an informant named
Hereford reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown
slacks and black shoes, and would be walking "real fast."
!d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his
information. 12
12
The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only reference to Hereford's reliability was that he had "been engaged as a 'special
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money,
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no
indication of how Hereford came by his information. At most, the detailed

1
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On one of the stated dates police officers observed a man
matching this description exit a train arriving from Chicago;
his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report and he was
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point
in his investigation, the arresting officer "had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had
the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And
surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable
grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information-that Draper would have the heroin with
him-was likewise true," id., at 313.
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone,_!_he
facts obtained through the independent investi ation of
Ma er an
e
a eas sugges e
at the Gates were
involve m rug tra c ng. n ad 1tion to bemg a popular
vacation site, F'Iorilla is well-known as a source of narcotics
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA,
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by Mader's
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford obtained his information, it was reliable.
13
The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details contained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corrobo-

I
I

~
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Court of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant
who had given reliable information on previous occasions,
while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police.
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time the police department received the anonymous letter, it became far
less significant after Mader's independent investigative work
occurred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that
the Gates's car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would
fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive
the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also
were true. "Because an informant is right about some
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli,
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring)-including
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to
ration of innocent activity," J. A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in
the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,
36 (1963).
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to
require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands.
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable
cause. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a
determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.
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satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we
think it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that
"corroboration through other sources of information reduced
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v.
United States, supra, 362 U. S., at 269, 271.
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details
relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate
information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves,
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gates's alleged illegal activities. 14 Of
14
The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in the anonymous informant's letter-its statement that Sue Gates would fly from Florida to Illinois, when
in fact she drove-and argues that the probative value of the entire tip was
undermined by this allegedly "material mistake." We have never required that informants used by the police be infallible, and can see no reason to impose such a requirement in this case. Probable cause, particularly when police have obtained a warrant, simply does not require the
perfection the dissent finds necessary. Moreover, the character of the informant's "mistake" does little to reduce the reliability of the informant's
tip. Sue Gates's decision to revise her travel plans is no different from the
last-minute changes that travellers frequently are wont to make. It
scarcely is reasonable to require the informant to have predicted this kind
of change, as well as the other details that he was right about.
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's argument that the Gates's action in leaving their home unguarded undercut the informant's claim that
drugs were hidden there. Indeed, the line-by-line scrutiny that the dissent applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that we find inappropriate in
reviewing magistrate's decisions. The dissent apparently attributes to
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course, the Gates's travel plans might have been learned
from a talkative neighbor or travel agent; under the "twopronged test" developed from Spinelli, the character of the
details in the anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of
knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra, - - ,
probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate
with formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained
his entire story either from the Gates or someone they
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter's
predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent,
therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search
the Gates's home and car existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be
Reversed.

the magistrate who issued the warrant in this case the rather implausible
notion that persons dealing in drugs always stay at home, apparently out of
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by criminals. If accurate, one could
not help sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation of people so situated.
In reality, however, it is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever thought
that the anonymous tip "kept one spouse" at home, much less that he relied
on the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter simply says that Sue
would fly from Florida to Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates's
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in their house, or those in their
car, unguarded. The magistrate's determination that there might be
drugs or evidence of criminal activity in the Gates's home was well-supported by the less speculative theory, noted in text, that if the informant
could predict with considerable accuracy the somewhat unusual travel
plans of the Gates, he probably also had a reliable basis for his statements
that the Gates's kept a large quantity of drugs in their home and frequently
were visited by other drug traffickers there.
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Supplemental List
Motion of the SG for Leave
to ~ile Reply Brief as
Amicus Curiae

SUMMARY:

After the Court restored this case to the calendar

for reargument, the SG filed an amicus brief.

Resps and other

amici filed briefs and directed many of their arguments to the
SG's brief.

The SG now moves for special leave to file a reply

brief as amicus so that he might address those arguments.

He

recognizes that Rule 36.5 of this Court's Rules disallows such
filings but contends that the importance of the Fourth Amendment
issue presented and the United States' substantial interest
warrant an exception.

DISCUSSION:

Rule 35.6 clearly states that "[n]o reply brief

of an amicus curiae will be received."

No exceptions are

..

permitted within the Rule itself and the SG has presented none -to
support the relief he requests.

His position has already been

set out in ·his amicus brief and if he wishes to address the
arguments raised by the resps and other amici he may use his time
at oral argument (as amici) to do so.
The Court could of course, as the promulgator of its own
rules, view this case and the offered brief as exceptional
circumstances and grant the motion.

However the precedential

effect of such would counsel against that option.
Should the Court view the SG's brief as worthy of
consideration, it might simply decline to act on the motion and
direct the Clerk to lodge the brief; it
for review.

~ould

This latter option seems the more appropriate

course.
There is no response.
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Michael F. Sturley

February 28, 1983

Question Presented
Should the Court recognize a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in this case?
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I.

Background

On October 13, the parties argued the question presented
in the cert petn:
tip,

Was the information provided by an anonymous

coupled with police corroboration of some of the

information,
warrant?

sufficient to provide probable cause for

innocent
a search

On November 29, the Court invited the parties to argue

the additional possibility of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,

despite the fact that the Court had denied the

State permission to argue this question originally.
My bench memo in this case dated October 6, 1982, summarizes the factual background and the decisions below.

II.

Discussion

My previous bench memo in this case discusses the question presented in the cert petn.

In this bench memo I will only

address the issue not previously discussed.

A.

Assumptions
In addressing the good faith

tions.

First,

I

assume

that

the

issue,

I make two assump-

information provided

by

the

anonymous tip in this case, when coupled with police corroboration of some of the innocent information, was sufficient to provide probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

For

the reasons given in my prior bench memo, I continue to believe
that this assumption is wrong.

But you have been unconvinced by

my earlier arguments, and I assume your position is now settled. ~

Second,

I

assume that some good faith exception to the

exclusionary rule would be appropriate.

In Brown v.

Illinois,

422 U.S. 590 (1975), you wrote:
[I)n some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the
legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes ....
All Fourth Amendment violations are, by constitutional definition, "unreasonable."
There are, however,
significant practical differences
that distinguish
among violations, differences that measurably assist in
identifying the kinds of cases in which disqualifying
the evidence is likely to serve the deterrent purposes
of the exclusionary rule •...

[There are] "technical" violations of Fourth Amendment rights where, for example, officers in good faith
arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later
invalidated or pursuant to a statute that subsequently
is declared unconstitutional .... As we noted in Michigan v. Tucker [417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)]: "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at
the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right."
In cases in which this
underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale
of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can see
no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence.
Id., at 608-609, 611-612 (POWELL, J., concurring in part).

This

language certainly suggests that there should be an exception to
the exclusionary rule,
Fourth Amendment.
n.

2

at least for

technical violations of the

See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414

(POWELL, J., concurring)

("technical,

trivial, or

inadver-

tent violations")
With these assumptions in mind, I see this reargument as
presenting essentiall

Do the facts of this case

justify a good faith exception?

And is this an appropriate case

in which to announce a good faith exception?

B.

This Case as an Appropriate Vehicle
I deal with the second question first.

There are seri-

ous problems that counsel against using this case as the vehicle
for

creating

the good

that are discussed

faith

except ion.

These

include problems

in the briefs and problems of which counsel

cannot be aware.

(1) Problems on the Public Record.
nized problems have been discussed

The generally recog-

in the various briefs,

will highlight only two of them here.

so I

The first problem is the

)

argument until

fact that the State did
.February 8,
Court

1982--more

--rendered

than a year

---

after

the

its final judgment in the case.

r---

-

Illinois Supreme

..

r

~
Thus the Ill1no~~

state courts were never given the opportunity to pass on the

pos- ~

sibility of a good faith exception, even in a petn for rehearing. ~~Y
If I

were writing the pool memo in a federal case and

petr sought review of an issue not raised below,

I would point

that fact out in my discussion and assume that nothing more needed to be done.

See, e.g., cert pool memo in No. 82-1214, at 3.
'

One of the Court's basic principles is that it will not review
questions that were not raised below. 1 ) Since this case comes to

< T~~~I2-Le1 The principle is so well establishe__d it .should not require
citation, but ample authority is cited jn the various briefs.

the Court from a state supreme court, there are not only the jurisprudential

problems

with

deciding

a

question

not

raised

or

considered below, but serious jurisdictional problems, as well.2
If the Court really wants to use this case to decide the good
faith

issue,

it should

remand the case to the state courts to

give them an opportunity to pass on the issue first.
The
first.

second

problem

is

perhaps

an

explanation

for

the

Other than preserving the federal issue for review, the

State probably would
good faith

have

accomplished

issue in the state courts.

nothing

by

raising

the

Illinois has long had an

exclusionary rule that exists entirely independently of its fed-

----

er ~ .

Thus

there

is

an

independent

and

adequate

state ground for the exclusion-G-f illegally seized evidence.

The

~

creation of a good faith exeption in this case would be nothing
more than an advisory opinion .
.....~.----.-·-----

~

131-4.,1"t;tzO,

,,a, s/C"f ~ ~ ~rJI" ~Lc.tt-cL ~

'-"-'S· sjc-1-. ~- ~"'"~" _,., .. 4 ~

2 There also seems to be a problem with the principles of federalism. Surely the Founders would not have intended the Supremy
Court to reverse the judgment of ~ the highest court of a sovereign
state on the basis of an issue that the state court never had the
opportunity .to consider·.
These pr i~iples were discussed by th
Court as recently as last Term. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
518 (1982) ("Because 'it would be unseemly in our dual system of
government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct
a constitutional violation,' federal courts apply the doctrine of
comity, which 'teaches that one court should defer action on
causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant
of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.'
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). ").
Here the
concerns are even stronger. In Lundy, the federal issue was necessarily dispositive, while here it is likely there was an independent and adequate state ground.

(2) Problems Not on the Public Record.

Counsel (unaware

of the Conference vote) have been unable to address the problems
created by
whatever

the

fact

happens

on

that

the

judgment below will

reargument.

Assuming

that

be

the

reversed
Court

an-

nounces its decision on the merits, the creation of a good faith

-----

exception here will be mere dicta.

--------- ~

The Court will be reaching

out to decide an issue that is unnecessary to its judgment.

It

makes no difference to resps if the evidence is admitted against
them because it was seized in compliance with the Fourth Amendment or because a good faith exception applies.
On the other hand, it would be an abdication of responsibility to reverse on the basis of a good faith exception without reaching the merits.

While it might be convenient for courts

to use the exception to avoid facing difficult questions, such a
practice (at least by appellate courts) would be particularly bad
policy.

To the extent the exception makes sense in a case such

as this,

it is only because the police were unable to know that

their

actions violated

the Fourth Amendment.

If courts simply

'

announce that, whether or not a violation took place, the excep~

tion applies~
~

~

3

police never will know how to conduct themselves

3 The SG encourages such decision-making (perhaps because it
would inevitably lead to an erosion of Fourth Amendment rights). ~ ?
His analogy with the harmless error doctrine, however, is unpersuasive. When a court announces that a particular course of conduct was harmless, whether or not it was an error, it does not
create the same problems, for good faith is not an issue. While
prosecutors in a similar situation in a later case might not know
if similar conduct will be error, this makes little difference to
the resolution of the later case.
Even if they know it to be
error, it could still be harmless without regard to their knowlFootnote continued on next page.

to avoid .Fourth Amendment violations
If

courts,

that

the

however,
good

announce

faith

that a

exception

may

not

be

repeated.

violation took

applies,

available but future officers will
conduct

in similar circumstances.

then

(or should)

Then

the

the

place,
evidence

but
is

know that similar

exclusionary

rule

can

serve its deterrent purposes and the number of .Fourth Amendment
violations will be reduced.

C.

The Good .Faith Exception on These .Facts
It is highly artificial to speak of an exception to a

rule

that,

on the merits, does not even apply.

I

suspect that

one of the reasons that it seems unfair to apply the exclusionary
rule here is your belief that the police and the judge who issued
the

warrant

complied

with

the

.Fourth

Amendment.

This

is,

course, a good reason not to reach the good faith question.

of
If

the Court does reach the question, though, I assume it could hold
that there was probable cause to support the warrant,
even

if

there had

but that

not been • probable cause the pol ice acted

in

reasonable 4 good faith.

edge. When police learn that certain conduct violates the .Fourth
Amendment, however, they would be unable to claim a good faith
exception.
To avoid repeating old violations, therefore, it is
necessary for the courts to announce what the violations are.
4The most commonly proposed formulations of a good faith exception would require subjective as well as objective good faith.
There is no record on the officers' subjective good faith here,
but on the evidence available ' it is hard to imagine that the officers did not act in subjec tive good faith. ~

7

/ ~~p~$
(1)
violation

The Probable Cause Standard.

that

~ ably

warran ~ n.

search

occurred

here

The Fourth Amendment

was

the

less than probable cause.

I

issuance

of

a

see no way that

such an error can be described as a "technical, trivial, or inadvertent"

violation.

Issuing

a

warrant

on

less

than

probable

cause violates the plain language at the very heart of the Fourth
Amendment:

"no warrants shall

issue,

but upon probable cause."

As you recognized in Brown v. Illinois, there may be "technical"
violations where officers in good faith arrest an individual in
reliance on a warrant later invalidated.

For example, the affi-

davit may be improperly authenticated, so that the constitutional
"oath or affirmation" requirement is not satisfied.

The issuing

magistrate may fill out the form improperly, 5 perhaps even failing to sign the warrant.

Assuming that the magistrate's inten-

tion is clear, such an error would be "technical."
trate

may

state,

fail

for

to

comply with

a

strictly

procedural

is

order) ,

rule.

A

example, may require the supporting affidavit to be

attached to the warrant for the warrant to be valid.
rant

Or the magis-

otherwise
failure

valid

(and

the

affidavit

is

If the warotherwise

in

to comply with this rule would be "technical,"

and the good faith exception would be appropriate.

5 In one case I saw recently, the officer and the magistrate
both used standard forms that referred to controlled substances-despite the fact that their intention was a warrant to search for
something else.
Each amended the standard form to delete the
references, but their editing was weak. As a result, there were
technical violations.
This is clearly a case where a good faith
exception would be appropriate.

There are, of course, a host of possibilities involving
warrantless arrests,
If

the

search,

pol ice
but

but again the error should be "technical."

incorrectly believe

the

belief

is

based

that
on

they have authority

some

error, then the exception could apply.

specific

good

to

faith

For example, they may be

mistakenly advised by radio that a warrant has been issued, when
in fact the warrant is not issued until after the search is cornpleted.

Or they may conduct a search incident to arrest when the

arrest is technically invalid.

Or they may believe, on the basis

of a good faith factual error, that they have probable cause and
are not subject to the warrant requirement, but the belief would
have been justified if their factual assumptions had been true.
The exception is not appropriate, however, when the police, knowing the true facts, mistakenly believe that those facts
...........,___

-----

~-

are sufficient to constitute probable cause.

"'

All an exception

would do in such circumstances is to lower the Fourth Amendment
standard from "probable cause" to "what a reasonable police offi- /
cer believes is probable cause."

In the grey area on the edge

probable cause, police will always make mistakes in both
tions, no matter where the line is drawn.

l

~

mistakes in

judgrnen~

Rather,

of_~ 1

~

direc-~

But these are not

takes of fact that can be made in good faith.

Ne

rni~ ~

the~

The existence of an exception to the

~

~

clusionary rule effectively removes the "incentive to err on the
'

~

side of constitutional behavior,"

.

ft.~

United States v. Johnson,

u.s. ___ , ___ , 102 s.ct. 2579, 2593

~

~

(1982), and provides an in-

centive to err in the opposite direction.

~

~·

(2)

Appellate Review of Magistrates'

Decisions.

There

is a stong temptation to view this case too narrowly, and to look
only at the behavior of the police who executed the warrant.
suming

that

they

acted

in

subjective good

supra, it is hard to fault them.
investigated

their

case

in

faith,

see

note

As4,

I think they could easily have

better

detail,

but

having

obtained

enough evidence to satisfy a presumably impartial judicial officer, one can understand why they went no further.

Thus there is

a temptation to adopt the rule suggested by some of the amicii:
the exclusionary rule will never apply when the police act pursuant to a warrant, unless the warrant was,
perjury.

Cf.

Franks v.

Delaware,

438

for example, based on

u.s.

154

(1978).

rule, however, takes too narrow a view of the system.

Such a

The exclu-

sionary rule deters not only the policeman who executes the war-~

rant, but everyone else in the criminal justice system.
courages the

It en-

investigating officers to investigate fully before

seeking a warrant and to make their best case to the magistrate
when

they

bureacracies

do

seek

to ensure

a

warrant,
that

their

it

encourages

officers observe

the
the

police
Fourth

Amendment, it affects prosecutors working with investigators, and
it encourages magistrates

to apply the probable cause standard

fairly.
Adopting

the

per

se

rule

suggested,

however,

has

the

effect of insulating virtually every warrant decision of a magistrate from appellate review.

This lack of appellate review would

be intolerable when one remembers that (i) proceedings before the
magistrate are

invariably ex parte,

(ii)

the magistrate is not

necessarily a lawyer,
magistrate
(iv)

(iii)

to whom the

the police generally can select the

request

for

a

warrant

is directed,

and

if a magistrate declines to issue a warrant, the police may

still seek a warrant from a second, third, or fourth magistrate.
It is proper, of course, to give considerable deference to magistrate's
best way

decisions

despite

all of these problems.

That

is

the

to encourage police to at least go to a magistrate. 6

But the possibilities

for abuse are too great when there is no

realistic avenue of appellate review.
undoubtedly act in good faith,

Although most magistrates

it requires only one in a juris-

diction to seriously erode Fourth Amendment rights.

D.

Retroactivity
Resps argue that if the Court does adopt a good faith

exception in this case, the rule must be applied prospectively.
Brief 60-66.

Although it generally is true that sharp changes

from earlier practice are not applied retroactively, resps' argument is silly here.

The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule

is

violations of

to deter

future

correct past violations.

the Fourth Amendment,

not to

Since violations that have already oc-

curred cannot now be deterred,

there is no reason not to apply

the good faith exception to them.

6Given your inclination to reverse, I would be happiest if
the decision were based on the considerable deference that should
be given to magistrate's decisions.

III.

Conclusion

The Court should not reach the merits of the good faith
exception issue here for a number of jurisprudential and jurisdictional reasons.

If it does reach the merits,

should not apply to the facts of this case.

the exception
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